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ABSTRACT
Current global economy involves highly interconnected mar-
kets competing with each other for market share and prot.
The recent global nancial crisis has revived research inter-
est in this competition and has brought out the need for
novel, ecient rules. TAC Market Design tournament is
one of the rst eorts in studying the interaction between
opponent stock exchanges. In this paper, we describe our en-
trant for 2009, Mertacor, and reason about the importance
of proper pricing in this global setting.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.6 [Computing Methodologies]: Simulation and Model-
ing; J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavioral
Sciences|Economics
General Terms
Economics
Keywords
Trading Agent Competition, Market Based Control, Double
Auction
1. INTRODUCTION
The double auction (DA) is an auction where multiple buy-
ers and sellers are able to submit committed oers to buy or
sell goods. This type of auction and, more specically, its
continuous form (CDA) is the dominant mechanism used in
major stock exchanges to trade various kinds of securities,
such as stocks, futures and options. Moreover, the absence
of a decision making center along with its high eciency
make the CDA an attractive choice for decentralised control
of open systems. Hence, many variants of this mechanism
have often been used in practical applications [3, 15].
Nevertheless, a detailed theoretical analysis of the CDA is
extremely dicult due to its dynamics and results may not
be valid in markets with boundedly rational human agents.
This turned the scientists' attention to agent-based models
[14], where software agents mimic human trading behavior,
and novel rules are automatically designed for the problem
at hand, a eld known as automated mechanism design [2].
The majority of research during previous years has been con-
centrated on isolated markets, which is not in accordance
with current global economy where individual markets are
often tightly interconnected. TAC Market Design (or CAT)
tournament
1 is one of the rst attempts to study this com-
petition among markets trying to attract investors and make
prots.
We have been participating in CAT since its beginning, in
2007, with the software agent Mertacor. This paper presents
our last year's strategies as well as the reasons behind our
design decisions. Moreover, we empirically demonstrate the
importance of the pricing policy in our agent's performance
and provide some measures we consider to be important for
the game. More specically, Section 2 shortly describes CAT
tournament. Our agent's strategies are presented in Section
3. Section 4 provides our empirical results for each of the
game's DA trading strategies. Finally, Section 5 concludes
this paper.
2. TOURNAMENT DESCRIPTION
The game of CAT comprises a server and two classes of
clients, namely traders and specialists. The game organizers
manage both the server and the traders, whereas specialists
are designed and implemented by the competition entrants.
Each trader has two strategies, a trading strategy and a mar-
ket selection strategy. The former determines the agent's
bidding behavior in the game and follows one of the four
popular DA strategies: ZI-C [6], ZIP [1], RE [9], GD [5].
ZI-C agents exhibit zero rationality, selecting their oers
randomly from a uniform distribution, but are not allowed
to trade at a loss. ZIP traders try to remain competitive
in a market by adjusting their prot margin according to
current market conditions, using simple machine learning
techniques. RE trading agents mimic human behavior on
trading, using recent prot as a reward in a learning algo-
rithm. Finally, GD traders consider the history of cleared
transactions and submitted oers and form a belief function
based on which they select their preferred oers. The mar-
ket selection strategy is responsible for selecting a protable
market for the trader, treating the selection as an n-armed
bandit problem [13].
1http://www.marketbasedcontrol.comEach specialist takes the role of a broker who must eectively
design the rules of its market so as to be protable while at
the same time satisfying its customers. There are typically
four high-level strategies it should follow: a) the accepting
policy, determining the oers that will be accepted in the
market, b) the clearing policy, specifying how and when will
accepted oers be cleared (i.e. led to transactions), c) the
pricing policy, which sets the price of each transaction, d)
the charging policy, selecting the amount of fees it should
charge traders for its services. There are ve dierent fees
in the game, namely the registration fee for the entrance of
the trader in the market, the information fee for extra in-
formation on oers/transactions in other markets, the shout
fee for each shout, i.e. oer, submitted, the transaction fee
for each transaction cleared, and the prot fee, which is a
percentage of the trader's prot from a transaction.
A game lasts a number of (virtual) trading days, each of
which is divided in trading rounds of xed duration. At
the start of the game, each trader, which can be either a
buyer or a seller, is endowed with a number of goods to
trade, called its entitlement, for each of which it has a pri-
vate value. This value corresponds to the highest amount it
is willing to pay for a purchase, if it is a buyer, or the lowest
amount it can accept for a sale, if it is a seller. At the begin-
ning of each day, specialists announce their fees and traders
register with their desired broker. For the remaining of the
day, traders are allowed to submit single-unit shouts (called
bids for buyers and asks for sellers), which typically lead to
transactions. Specialists are assessed on a daily basis using
three equally weighted measures, namely the market share,
the prot share and the transaction success rate (TSR). The
latter expresses the percentage of oers submitted that re-
sult in transactions. A complete specication of CAT rules
can be found in [4].
3. MERTACOR 2009
Given this background, in this section we describe our agent's
strategies for the setting of 2009 (i.e. constant private values
throughout the game and equal demand and supply quan-
tities). More specically, we provide an analysis of our de-
sired design objectives, which are more important to other
researchers than the strategies themselves. We focus on the
internal strategies of our specialist (accepting, pricing, clear-
ing policies), which we consider to be much more tightly
coupled than the charging policy. Although the latter can
certainly help a market strengthen its position in the game,
an entrant's primary objective should be the optimization
of its internal rules for its traders' welfare.
According to the theory of microeconomics, the aggregate
demand and supply curves of a market are expected to meet
at a point (pair of price and quantity) called the market's
competitive equilibrium (CE), where the allocative eciency
(i.e. traders' aggregate prot) is maximized. Buyers (sellers)
with private values above (below) the CE's price are called
intra-marginal (IM) traders, and are the ones that should
typically trade in the market, otherwise they are called extra-
marginal (EM) traders. Hence, in an isolated market, the
objective of a specialist is to estimate this point, making sure
that only the desirable, intra-marginal traders are allowed
to trade. Nevertheless, in a competitive scenario like CAT,
a specialist should also consider the quality of the traders it
should attract. In a global economy, there is a population
with a wide range of private values, so a specialist should
ideally identify and match "rich" buyers with "poor" sellers,
thus maximizing its prot margin. These traders are the
globally IM (gIM) traders, i.e. buyers (sellers) with private
values above (below) the global CE (gCE). The latter is the
CE of the equivalent global market where all traders would
trade had it not been their splitting due to the existence of
multiple markets.
In an ecient global CAT market, each gIM trader has a sin-
gle trading counterpart with which it should trade according
to the theory. However, the segregation caused by the oper-
ation of multiple specialists makes their coexistence in the
same market dicult, creating arbitrage opportunities. The
severity of this eect is increased as the number of markets
increases. Moreover, when traders are allowed to enter and
leave specialists at will, thin markets face a signicant prob-
lem in attracting new customers, nding themselves in a
worsening situation. Hence, the rst priority of a specialist
should be the increase of its market share (which can also
increase the probability of transactions and its prot share
while at the same time charging small fees).
Our specialist achieves this mainly through its pricing pol-
icy, which sets the price of all transactions at or, when not
possible, close to the gCE price, as estimated by our tech-
nique described in [11]. In this way, traders are incentivised
to stay in our market, as they are able to obtain a prot
approximately equal to their prot in a globally ecient al-
location, even though their counterpart may not be present
there at that day.
Besides implementing a fair pricing rule, it is important to
accept oers in an appropriate fashion. A tight accepting
policy increases the TSR but also the risk of missing po-
tential transactions. On the other hand, a loose policy de-
creases the TSR but can increase transactions' volume. We
have selected to combine both approaches in the long term.
More specically, for the rst (luring) days, when traders'
exploration is high and their attraction is much more im-
portant than our TSR, Mertacor implements a self-beating
accepting policy, according to which all shouts are accepted
when submitted for the rst time during a day, but only
self-improving shouts are allowed upon their current active
predecessors. For the remaining days, Mertacor enforces
a soft global equilibrium beating accepting policy: if gp
 is
the price of the gCE, then accepted bids should have a
price, pb  (1   k  stdev)  gp
, and accepted asks a price,
pa  (1+kstdev)gp
, where stdev is the standard deviation
of registered traders' last shouts recorded and k 2 [1;1:5] a
slack parameter.
Each specialist also faces the problem of imbalance between
daily buyer and seller populations, which means that some of
the gIM traders in excess remain unsatised, having no coun-
terpart to transact with. Our matching policy tries to com-
pensate for this through its two-fold operation. More specif-
ically, if n is the number of our daily traders and Mi is the
number of transacted items per trading agent i over the last
days, for the rst N = maxi(Mi);i 2 f1;:::;ng; rounds our
agent clears transactions at the end of each round, operating
like a clearing house. For the remaining rounds, clearing isTable 1: Results for each trading strategy when Mertacor utilizes estimated gCE. APE corresponds to the
mean absolute percentage error of each specialist's CE from real gCE. EPPT is the mean equilibrium prot
per trade.
ZIC ZIP RE GD
Score APE EPPT Score APE EPPT Score APE EPPT Score APE EPPT
cestlavie 0.432 0.059 44.973 0.108 0.345 23.493 0.411 0.059 48.904 0.535 0.042 52.113
CUNY.CS 0.237 0.142 32.505 0.098 0.505 21.898 0.312 0.107 42.478 0.407 0.156 49.430
IAMwildCAT 0.320 0.112 41.895 0.284 0.225 34.390 0.342 0.093 45.855 0.326 0.093 47.628
jackaroo 0.327 0.133 40.957 0.163 0.331 23.933 0.401 0.090 50.800 0.282 0.133 38.154
Mertacor 0.523 0.057 60.215 0.686 0.017 46.023 0.427 0.054 52.929 0.258 0.112 44.702
PSUCAT 0.259 0.117 38.671 0.167 0.236 31.946 0.301 0.085 47.538 0.361 0.060 51.852
UMTac09 0.431 0.066 42.374 0.087 0.325 23.703 0.425 0.066 46.604 0.356 0.064 38.986
Table 2: Results for each trading strategy when Mertacor utilizes real internal CE. APE corresponds to the
mean absolute percentage error of each specialist's CE from real gCE. EPPT is the mean equilibrium prot
per trade.
ZIC ZIP RE GD
Score APE EPPT Score APE EPPT Score APE EPPT Score APE EPPT
cestlavie 0.478 0.045 44.846 0.159 0.255 29.501 0.429 0.063 51.387 0.480 0.059 50.345
CUNY.CS 0.255 0.156 31.117 0.173 0.417 29.836 0.348 0.087 46.651 0.401 0.186 48.329
IAMwildCAT 0.309 0.108 39.174 0.571 0.055 49.895 0.343 0.088 50.391 0.330 0.104 44.125
jackaroo 0.381 0.103 48.910 0.187 0.268 29.937 0.436 0.088 54.985 0.268 0.162 36.071
Mertacor 0.368 0.052 48.034 0.404 0.056 48.256 0.341 0.073 48.980 0.282 0.098 45.220
PSUCAT 0.240 0.110 34.755 0.381 0.067 52.242 0.318 0.077 50.519 0.384 0.074 51.834
UMTac09 0.467 0.054 44.446 0.104 0.306 25.426 0.445 0.061 49.605 0.407 0.064 40.805
continuous, so a transaction is executed as soon as there is
a matchable pair of bids and asks. Matching is always per-
formed between highest bids and lowest asks. Hence, for the
rst part of each day, Mertacor matches "good"gIM traders
(i.e. buyers and sellers with the highest and lowest private
values respectively, or with the smallest prot margin), and
then makes an eort to match the remaining gIM buyers or
sellers in excess with IM sellers or buyers respectively.
Finally, our charging policy charges only a small amount
of prot fees. This is the only type of fees that allows for
fair and discriminatory charging so that each trader's pay-
ment is proportional to its shout's price deviation from the
gCE price. For the rst luring days, no fees are charged.
Then, a moving average on our market share determines the
appropriateness of charging: if our market share during the
previous days increases, then a starting fee of 5% is charged.
This process is repeated for the remaining days, using a con-
servative fee step of 1.5%.
4. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In [7, 10], the authors have reasoned about the importance of
the pricing of transactions when designing a market. How-
ever, our main question still remains: in a global economy
with highly interconnected stock exchanges, where bidders
are free to move between markets for their trades, is it still
advisable for a specialist to follow the short-term strategy of
targeting for its internal CE, thus disregarding the remain-
ing global population in its pricing policy? In this section,
we make a rst eort to empirically demonstrate the eect
of this type of pricing policies in CAT.
We have conducted a number of experiments to evaluate our
specialist's performance against available opponents. Then,
we have changed its accepting and pricing policies so that
the real, internal CE is used instead of the estimated gCE,
and observed corresponding dierences. All specialists (ces-
tlavie, CUNY.CS v.1, IAMwildCAT, jackaroo, Mertacor,
PSUCAT, UMTac09) were obtained from the TAC agent
repository, although we did not manage to run TWBB. Our
experiments were repeated for each of the trading strate-
gies in CAT (ZI-C, ZIP, RE, GD). More specically we have
used 200 traders for each experiment, keeping the expected
number of traders per specialist similar to that of the games
for 2009. Traders' private values were i.i.d. drawn from the
same distribution, U(50;150). All traders follow an -greedy
market selection strategy ( = 0.1,  = 1).
Our main evaluation criterion is specialist's game score. More-
over, we have recorded specialists' daily equilibrium prices
and have obtained the mean absolute percentage error (APE)
of these prices from the gCE price. Finally, although alloca-
tive eciency measures the eectiveness of market rules for
a given population of traders, it provides no information on
the quality of traders. For this reason, we have decided to
incorporate another metric, the equilibrium prot per trade
(EPPT). More specically, if (p

j;q

j) is the CE of a special-
ist j, and t is the private value of a gIM trader t;t 2 GIM,
then specialist's daily EPPT is:
EPPTj =
P
t2GIM jt   p

jj
q
j
(1)
Table 1 illustrates our results for the gCE case. As can be
seen, our specialist achieves the highest score and is also able
to attract the most desirable traders, depicted by its mean
EPPT, in three of the four cases. However, when facing
GD traders, its performance signicantly degrades, revealinga vulnerability for these traders, as was also noted in [8]
for our previous agents. The opposite holds for CUNY.CS,
which performs much better for the GD case. It is important
to note that our results for the score metric are dierent
than the competition's nals in 2009, when more entrants
are present in the game. Our agent also outperforms its
competitors in our experiments with identical strategy mixes
to those of CAT 2009 that we ommit here due to lack of
space.
To assess the importance of this pricing in our agent's per-
formance, we have repeated the experiments using the spe-
cialist's real CE instead of the gCE in its policies. The
results are summarized in Table 2. A CE based strategy
seems to have an opposite impact on the results, hence Mer-
tacor takes 4
th, 2
nd, 6
th, and 6
th place for ZI-C, ZIP, RE,
and GD trader populations respectively. Hence, only GD
performance is marginally increased.
Nevertheless, a closer look at the values for the mean APE
reveals a strong relation between an agent's score and this
metric. In all eight cases, the winner of the games had the
lowest mean deviation from the gCE price. This is true for
other positions as well, with a smaller APE corresponding to
a higher score, although dierences in specialists' charging
policies yield minor deviations from this empirical nding.
After this nding, we can see in Table 1 that Mertacor is
not able to coordinate its CE with the gCE for the GD
traders, thus explaining its poor performance for this strat-
egy. We believe that this is partly due to our gCE estimation
method's signicantly lower accuracy for this type of traders
[12]. On the other hand, our highly precise estimation for
the RE traders leads to the highest of all scores.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper details our agent strategies for 2009 as well as the
reasons underlying their implementation. As shown, Merta-
cor is the winner of all games except for the case of the GD
trading strategy, which deserves further investigation.
What's more, we have argued for the importance of the
alignment of individual CE prices with their global coun-
terpart. As was analytically demonstrated for our special-
ist, but also empirically validated for all entrants, it seems
that transaction prices settle near the global CE price on
the long term. Hence, in the global economy of CAT, the
sooner an entrant is able to accurately estimate this point,
the stronger is the possibility for a better placement.
As future work, we intend to improve on our policies, es-
pecially for the GD case. Trading strategy mix plays a
crucial role when designing markets, hence we are inter-
ested in studying the impact of corresponding changes to
the market's performance, following an evolutionary game
theoretical approach. Finally, we would like to investigate
the relation between pricing and charging policies and, more
specically, how to optimize fee values with respect to gCE
pricing for static and dynamic scenarios.
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